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But present levels of assistance are still nearly three times higher than a decade ago, and U.S. intelligence analysts believe it is unlikely that Moscow will substantially cut aid to its most reliable ally.

Cuba's difficulties, analysts say,

## woes show

By Roger Fontaine

bolstering a U.S. assessment that the country's economy is failing.
Representatives of the Club of Paris, a forum of the principal Western creditor nations, will meet next Cuba has quietly informed for-eign creditors that it will not meet a quarterly interest payment on its \$3.5 billion dollar debt due July 1,

fiery denunciations of Third World foreign debt, Cuba has always paid on time to preserve its heretofore Although Havana has requested a delay in payment before — a request denied — and despite Fidel Castro's week for three days to review Cuba's decision, and representatives from Havana are expected to attend.

prices plummeted this year.
The Russians also provide materials, equipment and advisers for economic projects, which currently include a nuclear power plant and an oil refinery in Cienfuegos, nickel processing plants in the eastern part of the island, and a supertanker port

in the last five years, however, and U.S. officials think the trend will Havana is Moscow's biggest aid recipient, taking more than half of Moscow's total aid package to the Third World. The aid has leveled off

dent on the Soviet bloc, U.S. officials

credits, making it even more depenits efforts to obtain more Western can standards will severely hamper

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Such a drastic step also highlights the seriousness of Cuba's current economic crisis, one that has provoked strong Soviet interference and created friction battunean Mosc.

cow and Havana, U.S. intelligence

with the Cubans over foreign policy

velopment assistance, accounting for 30 percent of Cuban national production. The Kremlin has given its ban economy is huge. It is estimated that the Soviets provide \$4.5 billion annually in trade subsidies and declient an estimated \$40 billion in as-The Soviet Union's stake in the Cu-

sistance since 1960.

The Soviets pay up to 10 times the world price for Cuban sugar and were selling petroleum to the Cubans at half the OPEC price before

Its sudden refusal to honor a debt obligation that is low by Latin Amer-

near Havana.

high credit rating.

more with fewer material incentives will impress Cuba's Western closing of the free peasant markets and his calls for workers to produce damentally change course. Nor do they think that Mr. Castro's recent They expect him to respond to in-

The economy's sluggish performance, in turn, has sparked increasing Soviet criticism of Mr. Castro's often erratic management style, accord-

petroleum.

ing to analysts.

U.S. intelligence sources say Soviet concern about Cuba has risen proportionally with the growing burden from other clients, notably

Soviet officials are also reported to be unhappy about the continued rationing of food and clothing in Cuba, which has gone on for 20 years. In a country blessed with much arable land and a year-round growing season, the turn from abundance to rationing is a major embarrassment for socialism. issues.

greater efforts and to accept even more austerity. He has also made some personnel changes in eco-nomic ministries, replacing party hacks with younger, more techni-Havana has tried to meet some of Moscow's demands. Mr. Castro in recent speeches, for example, has called on Cuban workers to make

cally qualified managers.

Nevertheless, analysts here believe the Cuban leader will not fun-

spending hard currency on Western imports. The Soviets insisted that purchases from the West be approved by Moscow and then be made only as a last resort, these sources years ago when a high-level Russian delegation scoided the Cubans for

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say.

Last year, Moscow informed Havana of its intention to assume greater control over Cuban investment decisions, leading analysts to believe that Cuba will be forced to concentrate on mining and agricul-

are rooted in poor productivity of its workers as well as continued low prices for its chief exports, sugar and nickel. The economy, particularly the sugar sales, suffered from a devastating hurricane last year, and the drop in the price of oil has badly hurt Havana's hard currency carnings from the resale of Soviet

Cuba's failure to meet trade and delivery commitments to the Soviet bloc. Sugar shipments reportedly have been undersized and deliveries have been late, and the Soviets may have pressured Cuba for the sugar by threatening to reduce oil subsidies, intelligence analysts say.

Cuba depends on the Soviet Union ture.

Moscow is also nettled over

for 95 percent of its oil, which in turn accounts for nearly all of Cuba's energy production. The last time the Soviets delayed oil deliveries was in

groups directly subordinate to him-self — a possibility that holds the promise of an even more erratic management of the Cuban tactics, and by creating informal creased Soviet pressure with delay ρū-

One sign that Mr. Castro will

one ministry.

As further evidence of his defi-One sign that Mr. Castro will not abandon his pet high-technology economic projects — despite Soviet objections — is his decision to consolidate the electronics industry into closest associates, Ramiro Valdes, a former minister of the interior, in charge of the electronics industry. As a career secret policeman, Mr. ance, intelligence sources cite the fact that Mr. Castro placed one of his

electronics.

Mr. Castro has also become personally involved in the creation of a huge medical research facility, again despite Soviet criticism. Begain despite Soviet criticism. sides pushing genetic engineering, Mr Castro hopes to attract world hard currency-paying patients, class scientists to Cuba as well Valdes knows next to nothing about

